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FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CONTRACTS 
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In The Choice Theory of Contracts, we explain contractual freedom and 
celebrate contract types.  This Issue offers penetrating critiques.  Here, we reply 
by refining choice theory and showing how it fits and shapes the contract canon.   
I. Freedom. (1) Charles Fried challenges our account of Kantian autonomy, 
but his views, we show, largely converge with choice theory.  (2) Nathan Oman 
argues for a commerce-enhancing account of autonomy.  We counter that he 
arbitrarily slights noncommercial spheres central to human interaction. (3) 
Yitzhak Benbaji suggests that choice theory’s commitment to autonomy is 
overly perfectionist.  Happily, in reply to Benbaji, we can cite with approval 
Charles Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties.” 
 II. Choice. (4) Aditi Bagchi criticizes our inattention to impediments to 
choice.  We show how choice theory’s commitments to both multiplicity and 
relational justice ameliorate these impediments.  (5) Gregory Klass explores 
parol evidence to highlight the mechanics of choice.  We substantially concur 
and show how such mechanisms can ensure voluntariness, an essential element 
of choice.  (6) Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette question the institutional 
capacity of existing legal actors to implement choice theory.  Working from the 
example of cohabitation, we offer a somewhat more optimistic view.   
 III. Contracts. (7) Peter Benson argues our focus on the rational slights the 
reasonable.  Although we did not use this Rawlsian vocabulary, choice theory 
complies with its strictures, more so than transfer theory.  (8) Daniel Markovits 
and Alan Schwartz argue provocatively that contract theory must capitulate 
before pluralism (as they endorse), leverage it, or fall victim to an embracing 
approach (their charge against us).  We reject the charge choice theory is 
foundationally value pluralist.  Instead, we cabin pluralism and put it to work.  
(9) The Contract Canon starts on the next big step for choice theory by 
explaining existing doctrine (rebutting Benson on lack of fit) and helping 
adjudicate contract practice (countering Markovits and Schwartz on the vices 
of our pluralism).  Choice theory fits and shapes the contract canon. 
Each paper in this Issue advances the field; each prompts us to refine choice 
theory – all steps we hope toward a more just and justified law of contract. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199629 
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FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CONTRACTS 
 Hanoch Dagan* & Michael Heller** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Choice Theory of Contracts,1 we advance a liberal approach to contract that 
celebrates contract types and justifies contractual freedom.  Here, we reply to critics. 
First, in Choice Theory, we reject the universalizing tendency of the Willistonian 
project and instead highlights contract’s multiplicity.  We shift emphasis from “general” 
contract law to (or rather, back to) particular contract types. Contract types – including the 
residual type of “freestanding contracting” – are the proper categories for law design.  We 
are not the first to warn against the flattening effects of contract monism and the 
unprincipled multiplicity of the common law (and European civil law) that Williston hoped 
to systematize. But unlike other critiques, choice theory offers a principled account of 
contract’s multiplicity. The principle that grounds contract law is autonomy.  
Our second departure concerns the meaning and role of freedom in contract.  
Liberal theories of contract typically aim at distilling an autonomy-based account purged 
of any teleological foundation. Our account is diametrically opposed:  choice theory 
embraces autonomy’s role as the telos of contract. Contract, we argue, is a valuable 
convention – indeed, a convention that any liberal polity must enact – because, and to the 
extent, it proactively enhances individual autonomy, defined as people’s self-determination 
or self-authorship, that is, as our right to write and re-write the story of our lives.  
A key takeaway of choice theory lies at the juncture of types and freedom. Our 
teleological theory reveals contract to be essentially a power-conferring institution, not a 
duty-imposing one.  Contract law offers people a new power, the ability to make their lives 
meaningfully their own by legitimately enlisting others to their most important projects.  In 
turn, this insight implies that one of the most fundamental contributions contract can, does, 
and should make to liberal societies is to ensure an adequate range of meaningfully-
                                                                                                                                                                             
* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation & Director of the Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University. 
** Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Roy Kreitner 
for his helpful comments. 
1 HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). Subsequent references appear parenthetically in the text. 
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available, normatively-attractive contract types in each important sphere of human 
interaction.    
This Issue offers penetrating critiques of choice theory.  We are indebted to Charles 
Fried, Nathan Oman, Yitzhak Benbaji, Aditi Bagchi, Gregory Klass, Oren Bar-Gill and 
Clayton Gillette, Peter Benson, and Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz for their 
thoughtful and generous discussions.2  Our Response cannot address all their points nor do 
justice to all their subtleties, so we have confined our comments to the three main themes 
of this Issue: Freedom, Choice, and Contracts.  Each of their papers advances the field; and 
in turn, each helps us to refine and extend choice theory, a step we hope toward a more just 
and justified law of contract. 
 
I. FREEDOM: AUTONOMY, NOTHING LESS 
Charles Fried, Nathan Oman, and Yitzhak Benbaji take issue with the liberal 
foundations of choice theory. Fried argues that choice theory mistakenly disavows the 
Kantian approach to contracts. Oman takes a diametrically opposite view: he opposes 
choice theory’s reliance on autonomy as unacceptable to religious believers, and suggests 
that the only legitimate telos of contract is to serve commerce. Echoing Oman’s critique of 
neutrality, Benbaji claims that choice theory relies on an overly robust account of autonomy 
and offers a Rawlsian alternative, one not inflicted with the difficulties of what he views 
as choice theory’s excessive perfectionism. 
1.  Charles Fried.  We begin with Fried due to his canonical status as the founding 
father of modern liberal theories of contract.  Surprisingly, our positions largely converge 
with his. 
At first, Fried rejects the adjective “teleological” (or “instrumental”) and he refuses 
to renounce the Kantian premise of his promise theory (8-10). But it is, we think, no 
coincidence that he ultimately embraces choice theory and graciously describes it as an 
“account of contract as the facilitating framework of human collaboration under our shared 
master norm of autonomy [that] is richer, more useful, and truer than my own account in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: Lessons Learned, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. * 
(2019); Nathan B. Oman, Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. * (2019); Yitzhak Benbaji, Contract Law in a Just Society, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. * 
(2019); Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. * (2019); 
Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. * (2019); Oren Bar-Gill & Clayton P. Gillette, On the Optimal Number of Contract Types, 20 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. * (2019); Peter Benson, Unity and Multiplicity in Contract Law: From 
General Principles to Transaction-Types, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. * (2019); Daniel 
Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Plural Values in Contract Law: Theory and Implementation, 20 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2019). Subsequent references appear parenthetically in 
the text. 
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CONTRACT AS PROMISE” (20). Explaining why Fried is able to subscribe to choice theory 
helps clarify both what we claim and what we do not.  
Consider first our critique of modern Kantian approaches to contract, which are a 
genus of the “transfer theory” we detail in Chapter 3 of Choice Theory, in which a promise 
makes the promisee the sole and despotic owner of the jointly created right (however 
qualified it may be) vis-à-vis the promisor. The ambition of transfer theory, as we explain 
there, is to show why breach of contract is tantamount to conversion, so that the 
enforcement of wholly-executory contracts is justified even absent detrimental reliance by 
the promisee, although the only interpersonal obligation law can justifiably enforce is (in 
this view) solely negative, namely: to respect each other’s independence. But transfer 
theory, we argue, fails because it unnecessarily assumes an unqualified right to the 
promisor’s performance and because it is insufficiently attuned to the implications of 
contract’s nature as a power-conferring institution.  
There is no need for us to reiterate and further defend this critique here (we do so 
elsewhere, in response to Arthur Ripstein’s review of our book3). Why not?  It turns out 
Fried interprets Kant’s view on contracts in a manner consistent with choice theory.4  His 
restatement of promise theory happily (albeit implicitly) joins much of our critique of 
transfer theory. 
We criticized transfer theory to show that reciprocal respect to independence cannot 
plausible justify recruitment of the coercive power of the state for enforcing (wholly-
executory) contracts. But law, we further argued, is nonetheless justified in enforcing 
contracts thanks to contract’s important contribution to people’s self-authorship. As an 
essentially power-conferring legal device, contract allows people legitimately to recruit 
others to their goals. The word “legitimately” is key. Contract is a convention that offers 
this service of autonomy-enhancement, but it can work only if its invocation implies that 
the parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the convention it entrenches into the 
law. In a liberal polity, we claimed, people are justifiably expected to pay this (modest) 
price for the benefit of others, because our interpersonal relationships are governed by a 
reciprocal duty to respect each other’s right of self-determination (or self-authorship).5 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, [title], * L. & PHIL. * (2019). That piece thus also 
addresses Peter Benson’s claim that “a transfer conception of contract may be theoretically 
indispensable” (3). 
4 The question whether Fried misstates Kant’s position on contracts or is it Ripstein who 
mischaracterizes Kant’s theory is not for us to resolve.  
5 The text implicitly responds to Yitzhak Benbaji’s claim that “autonomy as self-determination does 
not justify the basic distinction between unenforceable informal promises and enforceable formal 
contracts” (2). Indeed, appreciating the autonomy-based justification for contract enforcement as a 
form of (quite minimal) affirmative interpersonal duty, which is necessary for other people’s ability 
to resort to contract’s autonomy-enhancing potential, implies that where the law is unnecessary for 
this or where resort to the law might even be counter-productive, forcible enforcement should not 
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On its face, this response might seem to aggravate, rather than relieve, the 
legitimacy challenge because it openly admits that enforcing contracts even where 
nonperformance generates no harm is tantamount to prescribing an affirmative duty to 
assist others in pursuing self-determination. This proposition is indeed devastating to the 
(Kantian) view of private law as a stronghold of reciprocal respect for interpersonal 
independence.6 But this view, we insisted, is wrong.   
Independence is an intrinsic value, not an instrumental value and not, we argued, 
our ultimate value.  Rather, it is a constitutive part – an essential ingredient – of the ultimate 
value of self-determination. This is why liberals like H.L.A. Hart are correct in insisting 
that not every infringement of independence ignores “the moral importance of the division 
of humanity into separate individuals and threatens the proper inviolability of persons.”  
Therefore, with Hart, liberals recognize the significance of the “unexciting but 
indispensable chore” of distinguishing “between the gravity of the different restrictions on 
different specific liberties and their importance for the conduct of a meaningful life.”7 
Fried’s contribution to this Issue largely reaffirms these claims, in which the 
legitimacy of contract enforcement depends upon a modest affirmative interpersonal duty. 
Fried explains that promise theory is preoccupied not only with the exercise of our freedom, 
but also with its enlargement (8). He thus claims that we have “a duty of virtue” (6) to 
enlarge each other’s freedom, which in its turn is the premise of “the rightness, the justice, 
of state compulsion in certain circumstances to keep faith with the promise, now called a 
contract” (5). These propositions are congruent with Choice Theory.  They are not a 
challenge, but an affirmation. 
Also, Fried’s contribution helps clarify the limited sense in which our account is 
teleological. Nothing in our view embraces a teleological approach to morality. We tried 
to be precise on this point in the book.  Perhaps we should state it more forcefully:  choice 
theory insists that contract should be analyzed in terms of its autonomy-enhancing telos; 
not that this is the proper way to analyze morality in general.  With Fried, we treat 
individual autonomy as an end, rather than a means; and like Fried, we celebrate contract’s 
contribution to this end.  
Choice theory’s claim, in Fried’s terms, is that the “second-order” promises that 
constitute the “convention or practice” of promise cannot be simply assumed (as transfer 
theory does).  Rather – and we concur in this view – they should be prescribed so that they 
indeed enlarge our freedom. This lesson will be our starting point of Part III. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be available. Cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
6 See generally ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
(2009).  
7 H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 834-35 (1979). 
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* * * 
2.  Nathan Oman.  Nathan Oman fiercely objects to this “grandiose vision of 
liberalism that places at its center a strong vision of autonomous choosing individuals” 
(34). Autonomy, he argues, cannot plausibly justify contract once “alternative moral 
stances, such as those informed by monotheistic religions, are seriously considered” (3). 
The reason is that for most religious believers “there are moral principles whose validity 
does not rest on their contribution to the quality of human life” (14); indeed, for many 
“morality consists not in the affirmation of the self but rather in forgetfulness of the self” 
(15), and self-authorship is a sheer “myth” since by the time we reach adulthood we are 
“already infected by a life time of unchosen commitments and influences” (17). Because 
choice theory rests on “highly contestable moral premises that are rejected by many 
reasonable citizens” it cannot “generate either practical or theoretical legitimacy” (12), and 
should thus be rejected. 
Instead of autonomy, contract’s legitimacy relies, in Oman’s view, on “more 
modest and thus more widely acceptable premises” (12), namely, its role as “a midwife to 
commerce” (35). Contract law is legitimate, in this account, because it is “a mechanism for 
enhancing well-functioning markets” (32), which in turn “mediate the peaceful co-
existence of those with incommensurable moral commitments” (4). Promoting autonomy 
may still be important, not as “a primary normative ideal,” but rather as an instrumental 
value, which helps fostering this “modus vivendi vision of liberalism,” in which “[m]arket 
exchange provides an institutional framework for cooperation among those with 
incommensurable worldviews” (26). This means that, pace our critique, “Williston got it 
right” in perceiving contract law as “a framework of relatively abstract rules that have little 
if any substantive content,” and in presenting “the commercial contract [as] the core case 
of contract law” (29). 
Oman raises important concerns. But his critique is exaggerated and, insofar as it 
is not, must be rejected.8 We begin by refining his concern. Oman does not dispute our 
claim that “our approach seems to score quite high on the neutrality test” insofar as it refers 
to “concrete neutrality” (CTC, 88-89), but argues that it fails the test of “neutrality of 
grounds” given that many people do not accept the prescriptions of autonomy. This failure, 
he seems to suggest, is troublesome because it implies disrespect to alternative, reasonable 
moral stances that discount the possibility or the value of individual self-authorship.9  
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Moreover, the alternative justificatory premise Oman proposes is at best question-begging. The 
market, which for Oman is contract’s master, is not self-defining; quite the contrary: its design 
necessarily reflects value choices. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and 
The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
9 It is possible to read Oman’s complaints in a broader way, as raising neutrality concerns regarding 
the use of self-authorship as the polity’s ultimate value. Exploring these critiques of perfectionist 
liberalism (or rather the very thin version of it we endorse), or the sustainability of the alternative 
position – political liberalism – advocated by the critics, surely exceeds the scope of the present 
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Religious believers certainly deserve equal concern and respect and resorting to 
justifications that undermine such respect is, thus, at least a priori troublesome. But it is 
hard to see how treating self-authorship as contract’s telos can be offensive in this way. 
One reason for this is that while people who identify themselves as religious believers in 
the ways Oman typifies may not subscribe to the ideal of self-authorship, the ideal cannot 
be as alien to them as he postulates. As Leslie Green explains, the position that grounds 
freedom in self-authorship and the view (which Oman represents) that the value of freedom 
is founded on authenticity “are not completely distinct,” because the former must recognize 
the significance of the “unchosen features of life” that “friends of authenticity” emphasize 
as “means to, or constituent parts of, various life plans,” whereas the latter must recognize 
the significance of choice associated with “friends of autonomy,” if not “in order to choose 
one’s path in life, then in order to discover it.”10 
Furthermore, Oman’s critique disregards the nature of contract as a voluntary 
undertaking and of contract law a power-conferring body of law. Let’s assume, with Oman, 
that religious believers have no difficulty in recruiting contract law to facilitate commerce, 
but object to its use for facilitating voluntary undertakings in other spheres of interpersonal 
interaction consistent with interpreting, developing, and reforming contract law so it better 
serves self-authorship. When people object to expanding contract’s empowering potential 
to the spheres of work, housing, or intimacy, they do not imply there should be no 
interpersonal interactions in these spheres, of course. Rather, they signal the acceptability 
– to them – of the currently dominant form of such interactions and resist the notion that 
law should also facilitate other forms.  
 The crucial point is that making contract law more autonomy-enhancing does not 
affect objectors’ ability to pursue their conception of the good.  Objectors need not invoke 
or use these additional contract types and can limit their interpersonal interactions in these 
noncommercial spheres to the currently dominant form (say, traditional marriage). This 
means that, insofar as religious believers are offended by the notion that contract law 
should be autonomy-enhancing, their affront is not based on an objection that they 
themselves will be guided by it (guidance they are free to reject). 
Rather, their affront must be premised (assuming that there are no external effects) 
on their objection to allow others to benefit from such empowerment. This observation 
implies that Oman’s critique of grounding contract in autonomy is premised on a demand 
                                                                                                                                                                             
inquiry. For a persuasive critique, see David Enoch, Against Public Reason, 1 OXFORD STUD. POL. 
112 (2015). For our purposes, it suffices to note that the most significant critique of perfectionist 
liberalism as a form of disrespectful paternalism – see JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT 
PERFECTION 85-96 (2011) – is inapplicable to choice theory which concerns the state’s obligation 
in contract law specifically. 
10 Leslie Green, What is Freedom For?, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193674. 
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that law respects those people’s “external preferences,” namely, their views as to the proper 
“assignment of goods and opportunities to others.”11 As Ronald Dworkin argued, taking 
this type of preferences seriously violates, rather than vindicates, “the right of everyone to 
be treated with equal concern and respect.”12  
Indeed, the practical implication of Oman’s celebration of relatively contentless 
contract rules that cater to facilitating commerce is to delimit the range of contract’s 
empowerment potential to the commercial sphere. Oman may be correct in saying that this 
understanding of contract reflects the status quo – it reifies the Willistonian paradigm that 
is blind, as choice theory demonstrates, to the tilted way in which contract’s empowering 
potential is distributed; and it thus marginalizes the urgency of our reform proposals for 
enriching the repertoire of contract types in the spheres of home, work, and intimacy. But 
this quietism is far from neutral. Quite the contrary: it arbitrarily disfavors these 
noncommercial spheres of human interaction that are for many (most?) people at least as 
significant as commerce.  
We do not deny that some of our autonomy-enhancing reform proposals that 
expand the empowering potential of contracts to noncommercial spheres are 
controversial.13 But controversy in and of itself is not a principled objection; and because 
no credible vision of liberalism – as modest as it may be – can discard the injunction of 
respecting all persons equally, no credible version of liberalism can downgrade people’s 
equal right to choose – or, indeed, to discover – their own path (or, for that matter, authorize 
their systemic subordination, a point we discuss later).14 
* * * 
3.  Yitzhak Benbaji.  Yitzhak Benbaji’s essay implies that these responses may not 
be subtle enough. Benbaji helpfully highlights the distance between choice theory’s 
normative commitment to self-determination “as its basic, organizing, value” and Millean 
perfectionism, whose ultimate value is “the quality of life of humans” (8, 3). But he still 
thinks that a commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist and is thus unqualified to 
serve as contract’s telos. Benbaji claims that only “universal morality and instrumental 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 275 (1977). 
12 Id. 
13 Oman invokes the inapplicability of choice theory to the discussions about same-sex marriage as 
evidence to “the difficulty of defending . . . liberal institutions . . . using autonomy” (11). Choice 
theory is indeed orthogonal for this discussion, not for the reason Oman mentions, but rather 
because the issue there is that a liberal state must make the (autonomy-enhancing) institution (or 
contract-type) of marriage equally available to everyone.  
14 It is thus no surprise that even harsh critics of perfectionist liberalism sanction legal practices 
that combat practices of (women) subordination and ensure people’s ability “to leave one view and 
opt for another.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 3, 29, 36 (2011). 
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rationality” should “inform the provision of contract types” (19). This means that contract 
law should “empower[] individuals to act together” in order either to secure their ability 
“to abide by their universal moral duties” or to ensure to them the provision of resources – 
“stable income and wealth” – that are needed “in order to form and pursue a conception of 
the good life, whatever this conception of the good might be” (20, 22).  
His approach to contract is “inspired by Rawlsian neutralism” (20). This inspiration 
offers a non-perfectionist contract law, one that insists that “the duty of states to provide 
contract types” is analogous to their duty to provide roads (16). The core idea is that, pace 
choice theory’s injunction to ensure “demand-insensitive diversity,” contract law should 
be guided only “by people’s pre-existing needs and preferences,” and therefore its supply 
of contract types “must be dictated by demand” (17). Focusing solely on demand allows 
this strategy to uproot choice theory’s perfectionism because it implies that law refrains 
from “shaping and imposing contract types” by reference to “worthy life plans and choice” 
(16). It thus ensures that the state does not engage in forming “value judgements about the 
worthiness of the options” that it offers to its citizens, thereby securing contract law’s 
legitimacy (4). 
Benbaji presents this program as “a teleological understanding of contract types,” 
which is “an attractive alternative to the way choice theory understands them” (21). 
However, clarifying the very modest sense of choice theory’s perfectionism and the 
important way in which contract types are different from roads implies that Rawlsian 
neutralism must subscribe to choice theory rather than challenging it. 
It is no coincidence that Choice Theory does not use the adjective “perfectionist” 
to describe choice theory. This omission reflects the important gap, mentioned by Benbaji, 
between the views of Mill (and Joseph Raz) and ours. While we indeed rely on the robust 
understanding of freedom as autonomy (or self-determination or self-authorship, terms we 
use interchangeably), for us, as Benbaji notes, autonomy is an ultimate value, rather than a 
means for securing a “rich and satisfying . . . life in terms of human perfections and 
excellences,” as it is in the Mill/Raz view (4). This is why our approach to paternalism is 
very different from that of Millean perfectionists, as Benbaji acknowledges. But it is also 
why choice theory does not include an account of “human perfections and excellences,” 
and is not implicated in troublesome perfectionism.  
The distance of choice theory from perfectionist views that adjudicate the 
worthiness of people’s conceptions of the good is evident in its prescriptions as to both the 
formation of the inventory of contract types and the reasons that “limit unworthy 
contractual relations” (12). Thus, choice theory prescribes that law’s repertoire of contract 
types for each sphere of human interaction must include a sufficient number of partial 
functional substitutes, so that it offers people alternatives; and one of the ways in which 
such a meaningful choice can be secured, we have argued, is by enriching this repertoire 
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by investing in minoritarian or utopian contract types. Hence, the demand-insensitivity of 
choice theory involves neither censorship nor worth-ranking.  
Note, choice theory does not embrace every type of contractual relation. But it is 
important to precisely define its reasons for limiting the repertoire of contract types. Like 
most (if not all) contract theories, it pays attention to – and would recommend limiting – 
systemic externalities. To this banal limitation, choice theory adds two important 
autonomy-based limits, which we introduce now and discuss in (a bit) more detail below:  
(1) Choice theory takes seriously contract’s role in facilitating autonomy, and thus 
requires contract law to always beware of the possible detrimental implications 
of its operations for the autonomy of the parties’ future self.  
(2) Choice theory implies that people’s use of law’s coercive power be limited to 
interactions that comply with its ultimate justification of reciprocal respect to 
self-determination, so that relational justice must serve as the floor of legitimate 
interactions eligible for law’s support. 
It seems to us that the Rawlsian minimalist position, which Benbaji develops, 
would concur, or at least not object to, these positions. Benbaji does not challenge – indeed, 
he embraces (14) – choice theory’s critique of the “Kantian minimalist” position (as he 
calls it) in which the enforcement of contracts can be justified by reference only to people’s 
duty of reciprocal respect to independence. Furthermore, and unlike Oman, Benbaji does 
not repudiate the liberal commitment to facilitate people’s pursuit of their own life plans; 
indeed, he argues that Rawls’s first principle of justice, which ensures people “a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties” is the premise of “empower[ing] individuals to 
act together by entering a contract that determines the terms of their collaboration” (20). 
This means, we think, that Benbaji must acknowledge the ineradicable autonomy-
enhancing role of contract in a liberal polity as well as its implications noted in the previous 
two paragraphs. 
Benbaji’s “contracts/roads analogy” need not undermine this conclusion – and the 
happy convergence between his position and choice theory – because alongside the 
important similarities between contract types and roads, there are also significant 
differences. As Benbaji notes, contracts, and thus also contract types, indeed piggyback on 
people’s preexisting goals and obligations. But contract types are nonetheless very 
different from roads, at least if roads are understood, as Benbaji presents them, in the 
(almost) strictly instrumental way of getting to a destination, which implies that other types 
of roads – say, scenic roads – are rare and indeed esoteric exceptions.15 The reason for this 
is that insofar as contracts are concerned, the way in which we achieve these preexisting 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 The cautionary language of the text is not coincidental. With Benbaji, we assume that “regular” 
roads are by and large demand-sensitive, setting aside further contexts in which states build roads 
to create demand, for instance when they plan to establish new communities.    
Dagan & Heller  FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CONTRACTS  10 
                                
 
goals does matter; and at times it matters a lot. This is exactly our point in emphasizing the 
importance of intra-sphere multiplicity and the empowerment it confers on people. 
We are not saying that there are no cases in which we would be indifferent between 
contract types as long as they get us there. But more often than not – even in commerce, 
the seemingly-classic instrumental sphere – people are not indifferent.  While contracts, 
like roads, are somewhat constrained by preexisting goals, in contract-land the significance 
of multiplicity is not esoteric.  
To circle back, Fried’s articulation (in his contribution to this Issue) of the value of 
distinct contract types captures the justification for expecting law proactively to enrich our 
repertoire of such types. Contract types, he writes, “offer parties a menu of possible 
interactions,” that are crucial for “party autonomy and self-fulfillment . . . because human 
interactions and legal interventions are hardly imaginable without them.” Just like 
“language that enables thought[,] without types, our minds would be blank.”  In reply to 
Benbaji, then we cite with approval Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our 
liberties” (19, 17, 16). 
 
II. CHOICE: CHALLENGING, BUT REAL 
We turn now from freedom to choice, which stands at the center of three other 
articles in this Issue, by Aditi Bagchi, Gregory Klass, and Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton 
Gillette. Bagchi is concerned that we overstate the work of choice theory in enhancing 
autonomy and understate (and maybe even obscure) the most important obstacles to 
people’s autonomous choice. Klass and Bar-Gill and Gillette turn the focus inwards, asking 
(respectively) how can choice – and thus autonomy – be enhanced via the attention to and 
development of contract types, and which legal actors, if any, can perform this task.16  
4.  Aditi Bagchi.  Aditi Bagchi criticizes our focus on contract types and our 
inattention to more important impediments to choice. She argues that because oftentimes 
“the point of contracting” is simply to assure promisees “that they will get something in 
return for conferring something of benefit on the promisor” (or to comply with their 
preexisting moral duty), the fact that an obligation was “assumed voluntarily does not tell 
us how important the agent was to the fact of its adoption, let alone its form or content,” 
and “it does not answer how much of a voluntary obligation is explained by the moral 
make-up of its author” (13, 14, 3). This observation implies, Bagchi claims, that while the 
exercise of the normative power to promise tells us that the promisor is “the kind of person 
who others regard as capable of authoring obligation,” it “does not tell us much more than 
that” (3). This means that “[m]any contractual promises poorly reflect the moral agency of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz also address this question. But because their institutional 
critique is entailed by their substantive one, we address them below together. 
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contracting parties,” which makes our focus on “the kinds of contract forms recognized or 
enabled by the state” unexplained (16, 4). 
Moreover, Bagchi contends that “[e]xpanding the menu of contract types would do 
little to expand more salient choices,” and might even deflect our attention from these more 
important constraints that inhibit people’s choices (2, 4). Thus, she maintains that “it is not 
clear how expanding the menu of contract types in [the employment] sphere importantly 
advances employees’ interests – from the standpoint of autonomy,” because “for the array 
of employment types to be relevant, employees need to be in a position . . . to trade off 
income in exchange for a contractual relationship that suits them in other respects” (4). 
Furthermore, Bagchi argues that we are “wrong to focus on the state as a direct regulator 
of individual transactions . . . as opposed to its broader role as a regulator and participant 
in the market,” because it is “in the latter role that it has the capacity to affect the material 
conditions under which parties make contract choices” (4). 
We agree with Bagchi’s claim that it is important to “unpack the moral significance 
of promising and assess” how well different promises “serve the underlying values which 
cause us to value promises as such,” and that there may well be “normatively significant 
variation among promises” (9). But this proposition does not imply that “market-
constrained promises” are the least “valuable or morally significant” ones (10), or that 
expanding the range of contract types entails only marginal normative value.  
To start with, even regarding the most extreme examples – of promises that are 
aimed at satisfying the promisor’s decision “to eat, live in housing rather than on the street, 
obtain medical care, etc.” (14) – the more options she has among contract types (or among 
providers), the better it is from autonomy’s standpoint. Moreover, Bagchi overly discounts 
contract’s contribution to autonomy even where it is made under substantial material or 
moral constraints. She defines this value as a function of what it reveals “about an agent 
and her moral capacities” (3). But she unduly discounts the significance of “future-oriented 
revelations.” Because contract – for both the haves and the have nots – is a future-oriented 
device, expanding the range of contract types is, other things being equal, autonomy-
enhancing. 
Consider the employment sphere. Bagchi agrees with our critique of “the stark 
choice between the status of employee and independent contractor,” but insists that “the 
vast majority of people do not make any such choice,” because “they take what is available, 
or maximizes their income,” so it “would not help them if there were intermediate 
categories recognized in employment law” (4). But would enriching the existing 
employment landscape, along the lines we suggest in Choice Theory, be of only marginal 
significance? Wouldn’t (potential) employees be better-off (autonomy-wise) if law would 
have facilitated, for example, job-sharing arrangement? Or if states promulgated two or 
more employment types, so that employers would need to elect one visibly (instead of the 
“at will” regime mandated everywhere, but Montana with its “for cause” regime)? And – 
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turning from employment to the housing sphere – wouldn’t the predicament of middle and 
lower income households (respectively) be improved if law followed our recommendations 
proactively to facilitate home equity insurance and shared equity types? 
Bagchi may not dispute that these would be improvements, but still insist that the 
more pressing difficulty for choice and thus for autonomy is in the material conditions 
under which parties make contract choices and that choice theory may deflect attention 
from these concerns given that addressing them seems to be beyond the “institutional 
capacity of contract law” (4). This is an important concern, especially given the significant 
wealth and power disparities of contemporary societies. So if indeed choice theory might 
have had such disturbing consequences, it would have justifiably undermined its 
credibility. Fortunately, this isn’t the case.  
We do not deny that background distributive injustices limit the ability of contract 
law, and thus of choice theory, to enhance autonomy. In fact, one implication of our claim 
that a power-conferring institution such as contract (or property) relies for its legitimacy 
on a commitment to self-determination is that this legitimacy in turn cannot be plausibly 
freestanding, but it rather depends upon a robust background regime that guarantees 
everyone the material preconditions needed for self-authorship.17 This is an important 
lesson that we should have clarified in Choice Theory.  But the point does not undermine 
the important autonomy-enhancing role of contract law (properly understood to apply to 
all contractual spheres and encompass rules originating from courts, legislatures, and 
regulatory agencies). 
To see why, recall that choice theory entails a commitment to relational justice as 
the floor of legitimate interactions eligible for law’s support.  Now, consider the 
implications of this commitment to employment and labor law. As we argued in Choice 
Theory, relational equality underlies labor law’s (far from sufficient) facilitation of 
workers’ unionization and collective bargaining. Moreover, the hierarchical organization 
that typifies the workplace explains employment law’s insistence on an inalienable 
infrastructure of just relationships, dealing with topics like workplace safety and 
nondiscrimination.18 It may well justify further reinforcement of workers’ autonomy by 
entrenching a workplace bill of rights that would protect them against managers’ arbitrary 
and unaccountable authority, particularly insofar as they purport to regulate workers’ off-
hour lives.19 Finally, appreciating the role of reciprocal respect to self-determination as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 See HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY * (2019). 
18 See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, Relational Regulators: Private Law Thinking for 
Administrative Agencies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id3031886; 
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1442–45 
(2016). 
19 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND 
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 39–40, 48–54, 60, 62–64, 67–69 (2017). 
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contract’s normative foundation implies that contract law cannot legitimately 
instrumentalize people to such an extent that might efface their humanity by erasing their 
ability to self-determine. This prescription applies to employment settings, such as 
sweatshops, in which workers are arguably dehumanized and treated as disposable 
commodities.20 
There are, of course, also other justifications for these propositions. But grounding 
them on the autonomy-based foundations of choice theory is nonetheless important, 
because it implies that friends of contract and champions of individual autonomy cannot 
but support the existing implications of choice theory that we have just mentioned and 
should work to eradicate the autonomy-reducing conditions choice theory’s reformist 
takeaways seek to transform.  
* * * 
5.  Gregory Klass.  Gregory Klass embraces – or at least accepts – choice theory’s 
claim as to the significance of “both a choice among contract types, and the power to 
choose to alter individual terms of a type” (5) and his extended discussion of the differences 
between parol evidence rules that apply – and should apply – to different contract types 
importantly supports choice theory’s emphasis on contract law’s multiplicity. But he is 
critical of Choice Theory’s neglect of “the mechanics of choice,” namely: the question of 
“how contracting parties make choices,” and of the “legal mechanisms for choosing,” that 
is, the question of “how the law determines the choices they have made” (1). 
Thus, Klass’ careful and interesting account of the parol evidence rule adds an 
important example to choice theory’s prescription for tailoring contract rules to the contract 
type, rather than imposing a set of one-size-fits-all rules on the entire inventory of contract 
types. While it is “widely recognized that different U.S. jurisdictions employ different parol 
evidence rules,” most accounts of those rules “describe each as a single rule for all 
contracts” (7). Klass studies two contract types – negotiated contracts between firms and 
consumer contracts – which both respond, in his view, to the same normative (welfarist) 
concerns (30), and his analysis “suggests parol evidence rules for these spheres that 
significantly differ from the common, generic formulations of the rule, and from each 
other” (16). In line with choice’s theory’s “more vulpine perspective,” Klass concludes that 
“there is not, or [at least] should not be, one big parol evidence rule, but local parol evidence 
rules for distinct spheres of contracting” (7). This multiplicity, Klass further argues, brings 
home his more critical lesson for choice theory: that it must pay “greater attention to both 
the mechanics of choice and the available mechanisms of choice” (32).  
Klass’ claim that the two contract types he investigated allow him to “hold 
normative concerns constant” (3), is exaggerated in our view. We surely agree that 
negotiated contracts between firms should be analyzed, by and large, as means for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 See Hanoch Dagan, Markets for Self-Authorship, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y *, * (2018). 
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maximizing the parties’ gains from trade, and that the welfare gains to both parties are also 
critical for consumer contracts. But we think that Klass’ claim that “the values at stake are 
similar” and that therefore the goal of contract law in this type as well should simply be “to 
help both sides maximize the gains of trade” (24) is overstated. Indeed, our “errand 
conception” of consumer contracts (which Klass mentions) implies that this contract type 
scores best at the autonomy-enhancement test if it is designed so that “law helps people 
make such transactions quickly, anonymously, and securely so they can focus their time 
and attention instead on other – more valuable (for them) – projects,” which means that 
“the non-bargained terms correspond to (or exceed) consumers’ typical expectations” 
(CTC, 81, 83).  
With that caveat, we agree with Klass’ claim that the (existing and desirable) 
differences between the parol evidence rule, which is indeed “one of the most important 
mechanisms of choice in U.S. contract law,” follows from the “important differences 
between the mechanics of choice in consumer contracts and those negotiated contracts 
between firms” (23).  This is an important refinement of choice theory: the design of 
contract types “should reflect not only the values at stake, but also the mechanics of choice 
in each sphere” (7).  
In Choice Theory, we acknowledged the significance of studying what Klass aptly 
terms “the mechanics of choice,” namely, the “parties’ preexisting abilities to choose, and 
the conditions under which they are able to make informed, autonomous and therefore 
valuable choices” (5). But Klass must be right that in addition to insights from cognitive 
psychology, choice theory must resort to some good old work of doctrinal technique.  To 
develop a truly autonomy-enhancing contract law, great attention needs to be given to what 
he terms “the mechanisms of choice,” including “the tools that the law gives [or can give] 
parties for exercising their power to choose” (5).  
Klass is also correct that the mechanics of choice are relevant not only to “parties’ 
ability to choose contract terms,” but also to “their choice among pre-established contract-
types,” because “party choice can operate to enhance autonomy and resolve competing 
values only when parties are willing and able to choose” (31-32). Klass focuses in this 
context on the practical viability of the mechanisms that may enable workers’ and 
consumers’ choice among contract types, as in the choice between being employees and 
being independent contractors or between purchasing a good with the protections of 
consumer protection law or by using sales law (31, 5-6). But in fact the significance of the 
mechanics of choice to choice theory goes even deeper than that. 
In addressing the challenge of ex post boundary disputes among contract types, we 
noted in Choice Theory that such “boundary arbitrage concerns may justify heightened 
formalities for entry – and such formalities should be refined with an eye to ensuring that 
both parties have the same contract type in mind” (129). But Klass’ justified focus on the 
role of the mechanics of choice implies that these formalities are much more important to 
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choice theory than we appreciated. This is because viable formalities that improve contract 
law’s mechanics of choice among contract types help minimize the inevitable 
“independence costs” that a properly autonomy-enhancing contract law inevitably entails. 
Recall that one of the most fundamental claims of choice theory (endorsed by Fried) 
is that law needs to proactively generate robust contractual conventions to expand the scope 
of people’s voluntary obligations, which in turn empowers their self-determination.  But as 
the legal infrastructure becomes increasingly elaborate – which it is in modern contract 
law, as we show in Part III – the risk that it will apply not only to fully voluntary obligations 
becomes increasingly real. Involuntariness is a problem that an autonomy-enhancing 
contract law must take seriously because it infringes the promisor’s independence, which 
is, as noted, intrinsically valuable.21 To some extent, this risk can – and again is – reduced 
by making the conventions of contract prevalent.  Like other major legal constructs 
(especially of private law), contract tends to become part of the backdrop of our lives and 
blend into our natural environment (CTC, 76). But an autonomy-enhancing contract law 
should not be content with this partial safeguard to the risk of involuntariness.  
Two features of contract law proactively respond to this risk. The first is 
straightforward: familiar doctrines – notably duress and misrepresentation – delimit the 
scope of enforceable promises to those that are not the product of the promisee’s 
manipulation of the promisor’s free will. The second important feature deals with contract 
law’s “entry rules” and was highlighted by Lon Fuller’s classic account of the functions 
performed by legal formalities. As Fuller noted, the significance of form in law goes 
beyond its evidentiary function. A formality, such as the requirement of writing, also 
performs channeling and cautionary (or deterrent) functions by offering “channels for the 
legally effective expression of intention” and by “acting as a check against inconsiderate 
action.”22 
While safe “in the hands of those who are familiar with their effects,” legal forms 
– like any other forms (Fuller, like Fried in his account of choice theory, used an analogy 
to language) – are not risk-free, but rather contain “dangers for the uninitiated.”23 This 
means that the performance of legal forms in minimizing the risk of involuntariness 
depends on their proper refinement and advertisement. By crystalizing, as choice theory 
prescribes, a stable set of contract types, each of which with its own animating principle, 
and by carefully adjusting – as per Klass’ important prescription – their entry rules to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 In other words, while Peter Benson is wrong to attribute to us the view that “the power-conferring 
character of contract law [implies] recognizing party capacity to effectuate legal changes that they 
deliberately undertake and purposively seek to achieve” (Benson, 7-8; the emphasis is ours), choice 
theory does aim at shaping a contract regime that optimally empowers people to cooperate through 
voluntary undertakings.  
22 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1941). 
23 Id., at 802. 
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pertinent mechanism of choice with an eye to these channeling and deterrent functions, a 
robust contract law performs better than a thinner one. Having in mind a salient model (or 
a few salient models) of the intended transaction likely reduces the probability of 
misunderstandings and thus involuntariness – at least by comparison with the alternative 
of contracting through the necessarily vague open-ended contract law.24  
* * * 
6.  Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette.  But who can undertake the task of crafting 
contract types so that they indeed fulfill contract’s promise of enhancing our autonomy? In 
Choice Theory, we raised this institutional question in connection with familiar concerns 
about the capacities of legal institutions – notably, generalist courts – to create good rules 
for sophisticated commercial parties. We did not doubt that such private parties are more 
competent for the task than are competing legal institutions. We argued, however, that there 
is no reason to extrapolate more devastating conclusions from the commercial context, that 
is, to imply no legal institutions are sufficiently competent to implement choice theory. 
Rather, “implementing choice theory is a matter of comparative institutional competence,” 
so that while “in the commercial sphere . . . private parties [are likely] to dominate contract 
type creation . . . in the family and employment spheres, other, more public actors, may 
take the lead.” Even in these spheres, legal institutions are surely not perfect for the task. 
But they are, or at least likely to be, better suited than the contracting parties (128, 131). 
Choice Theory offers some preliminary thoughts on possible strategies for coping 
with concerns of institutional competence – referring to what we call the comparative, the 
experimental, and the incremental strategies – alongside some examples, such as the 
judicial recognition of cohabitation which shows “the significant compliance (though 
imperfect and insufficient) of evolving contract law with the obligation to support 
multiplicity.” We acknowledged that much more work needs to be done on this front, 
noting that “full answers will inevitably be linked to a particular contract type or a specific 
state or national institutional design” (15, 132).  
Bar-Gill and Gillette add an important dimension to this institutional analysis by 
focusing on political economy.25 They are justifiably concerned with the “traditional rosy 
story of government,” which “treats government actors as cognizant of and motivated by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Cf. BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 57 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that because 
French lawyers are conscious of the traits of different contrats nommés, contracting parties can 
intentionally attempt to choose their preferred contract type). 
25 Bar-Gill and Gillette also address the issue of competence, arguing that “government would 
generally lack the access to information necessary to identify the optimal number of contract types” 
(*). We do not underestimate the significance of this task, but the evident undersupply of contract 
types in the non-commercial spheres of contracting – on which choice theory’s prescription focuses 
– makes this concern premature. Another concern they raise relates to the imprecision of the 
distinction between different terms and different types. We discuss this matter in Section 8 below. 
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(1) a widely shared view of the public interest, (2) the extent to which market failures 
inhibit achievement of that public interest, and (3) the tools and political will necessary to 
implement policies that align with that interest.” Bar-Gill and Gillette conclude that “Dagan 
and Heller’s faith in governmental processes to develop contract types is overstated,” since 
we are not sufficiently sensitive to “the public good nature of governance,” which implies 
the endemic collective action problems of government intervention (*). 
At times, these problems imply that government might undersupply contract types 
by either “affirmatively suppressing contract types that the market would create” or failing 
“to produce a contract type that the market fails to generate, and that government is 
uniquely positioned to produce.” A parallel, and for Bar-Gill and Gillette “greater 
concern,” is one of oversupply of contract types26 either “because interest groups with 
disproportionate access to the [pertinent] agency . . . lobby for an excessive number of 
types” or because “individuals in those agencies have incentives to create them in order to 
demonstrate to clients (congressmen, interest groups) or to superiors within the agency that 
they are performing their assigned function.” Finally, even if government actors may 
produce contract types optimal in quantity, “government intervention could cause 
suboptimal terms to be part of a contract type” (*). 
Bar-Gill and Gillette do not ignore that institutional inquiries are always 
comparative. They fully realize that the alternative to government involvement is leaving 
the task to the market and that this alternative is also far from perfect. Indeed, Bar-Gill and 
Gillette agree with choice theory’s premise that “standard market failures might cause 
markets to produce a suboptimal number of contract types,” although they also show that 
these failures at times may push in the opposite direction resulting in the provision of too 
many contract types. But Bar-Gill and Gillette are still worried that the political economy 
consideration they highlight may suggest that government involvement “might do more 
harm than good.” Thus, they conclude that whereas the lack of an “ideal mechanism” for 
implementing choice theory “does not deny [its] efficacy,” we need to be careful not to 
replace “market failure with government failure” that “replicate[s], rather than cure[s], the 
shortcomings of markets” (*). 
Point well taken. Adding political economy considerations to the comparative 
analysis of the expected performance of the pertinent institutions is surely important and 
there may well be contexts in which the expected shortcomings of government agencies 
would imply that we may be better off leaving the task to the market, notwithstanding its 
deficiencies. This conclusion justifies Bar-Gill and Gillette’s “cautionary note” (*). But 
nothing in this note is different from parallel concerns of “government failure” regarding 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 Bar-Gill and Gillette are worried about over-supply because an “excessively large number of 
contract types” is inefficient as it tends to reduce the positive externality of comparison-shopping 
and thus to dilute the forces of competition (*). Oversupply may also undermine autonomy given 
people’s cognitive constraints.  
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the numerous contexts in which agencies are currently involved. And yet, the least 
controversial set of justifications for regulation by governmental agencies includes various 
types of market failures, that is: cases in which for reasons like monopolies or anti-
competitive behavior, externalities or public goods, or informational inadequacies, an 
“uncontrolled marketplace” is likely to “fail to produce behavior or results in accordance 
with the public interest.”27 Yes, a rosy story of government must be rejected, but is no 
reason to choose instead a particularly gloomy story on the supply of contract types. 
Further, when we referred to the responsibility of legal institutions to contract’s 
autonomy-enhancing telos, we did not limit our account to agencies. Quite the contrary, 
we mentioned a long list of pertinent legal actors, highlighting “courts or legislatures – the 
ordinary contract lawmakers in liberal societies.” One (relatively) happy story we noted is 
the judicial creation of the law of cohabitation that structures “a distinct contract type which 
helps stabilize relationships of long-term informal intimacy between marriage and, say, 
roommates.” Courts’ responsiveness to “an emerging – albeit minoritarian – innovation,” 
we argued, is laudable from an autonomy-enhancing perspective especially given the 
“failure of cohabitants to gain legislative recognition,” which “may be best explained by a 
collective action and political economy story” (130, 132). 
The case of cohabitation may suggest a surprising but potentially important 
conclusion. Recall that our engagement with the institutional question in Choice Theory 
was aimed at limiting the incompetence critique of legal actors – in particular, judges – to 
the commercial context. Bar-Gill and Gillette’s focus on political economy implies that, at 
least in contexts where generalist judges do not suffer from this difficulty – that is, in the 
contracting spheres of work, housing, and intimacy where the injunction to proactively 
facilitate multiplicity applies most strongly (ch. 11) – courts should play a particularly 
important role in implementing choice theory.28 This conclusion nicely fits the common 
law tradition in which much of private law is the result the continuous law-making through 
judicial activity.29 It also fortifies the claim that, notwithstanding Bar-Gill and Gillette’s 
important cautionary note, “[t]here is room to implement choice theory such that contract 
law does a better job than the status quo in enhancing people’s self-determination” (15). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 
15 (2nd ed., 2012). 
28  We do not deny that even in these spheres, the private law of contract types may require 
regulatory support. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 1, at 76-78.  
29 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Principles of Legal Reasoning in the Common Law, in COMMON 
LAW THEORY 81, 82 (Douglas E. Edlin ed. 2007). For a defense of the role of judges in the 
development of private law, see Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON LAW 17 (Shyam Balganesh ed., 2013).  
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III. CONTRACTS: CHOICE THEORY AND THE CANON 
We conclude this short Response by engaging with important concerns regarding 
our understanding of contract. The first two are raised by Peter Benson, who argues that 
“choice theory does not seem to articulate a satisfactory conception of the reasonable for 
contract,” and that it fails “when assessed both as an interpretation of the law and also as a 
justification of its coercive character” (3). Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, in turn, 
argue that choice theory embrace of multiplicity comes “at the cost of abandoning 
theoretical depth and coherence,” which is not ameliorated by our appeal to autonomy as 
contract’s “mater value” (16). This difficulty is profound, because it means that either 
choice theory cannot plausibly guide decisionmakers or that its guidance is so cumbersome 
so as to make its implementation unlikely, if not strictly implausible.   
7.  Peter Benson.  Benson appreciates our invocation of John Rawls’ “account of 
the moral powers of free and equal citizens,” which “gives center-place to the moral power 
to form and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s own good” (10). But he reads choice 
theory as solely obsessed with this “idea of the ‘rational’,” while totally neglecting the 
other basic component of Rawls’ theory, namely: “the reasonable,” which is “an 
intrinsically moral idea involving moral sensibility in general and a sense of justice in 
particular.” The reasonable is important – both in general and for contract – because it 
requires persons to “act from fair principles for social interaction and cooperation,” and 
thus to respect “the equality and independent claims of others and expect[] the same in 
return from them.” It thus imposes “genuine obligations toward others and, where justified, 
these obligations can be coercively enforceable” (11).  
A second, and somewhat related,30 complaint Benson raises is that despite our 
ambition “to provide an interpretative framework for presenting contract law in [its] best 
light,” our book fails “to show with the needed detail that [choice theory] is reflected even 
in the main contract doctrines” (9-10). Benson believes that “this cannot be done,” making 
reference in this context to the doctrines governing contract formation, the objective 
standard, as well as to “the whole implied dimension of a contract (including implied terms, 
obligations, impossibility, mistake etc.) and the entire range of remedies for breach” (8-9). 
Furthermore, Benson argues that, without the component of reasonableness, choice 
theory cannot account for “the requisite nexus between promisor and promisee” (13) – 
linking here the “question of interpretative fit” with the requirement to “justify the basic 
moral fact that contractual duties are coercively enforceable.” Choice theory, Benson 
concedes, may imply that “[o]ne who voluntarily recruits another or accepts being recruited 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 As the text hints, Benson’s complaint of fit is only somewhat related to his reading of choice 
theory as lacking the component of reasonableness, because part of the difficulty he sees in choice 
theory as an interpretive account of contract derives from the extreme and unnecessarily demanding 
understanding of “power-conferring character” he attributes to choice theory. See supra note 21. 
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by another through such a device is required to perform what she has promised in order to 
fulfill this duty.” But this duty, he insists, is only “some sort of general positive duty” to 
“support and further a regime of voluntary contracts” that “enables individuals to advance 
their ends – hence their autonomy,” so “the most plausible obligee” is not the promisee, 
but rather “the community of present and future transactors or perhaps the body that is 
responsible for maintaining the regime of cooperation.” “To establish the requisite nexus 
between promisor and promisee, it is essential to show that there is a requirement of 
reasonableness that holds as between them,” which, and this is the key for Benson, “choice 
theory fails to do” (13-14).  
Benson is right to insist that a Rawlsian component of reasonableness is necessary 
to justify contract enforcement and this dimension is core for accounting for the status of 
the promisee as the right-holder authorized to invoke enforcement proceedings. But the 
fact that Choice Theory did not employ Rawls’ vocabulary of the rational and the 
reasonable, does not mean choice theory does not appreciate the role of reciprocal respect 
to the equal claims of others as a necessary foundation for the legitimacy of contract and 
its interpersonal character. Quite the contrary. While choice theory celebrates the 
autonomy-enhancing role of contracts, it explicitly recognizes that the legitimacy of 
recruiting law’s coercive power for its entrenchment – and thus the scope of contract law’s 
legitimate power – depend upon a prior interpersonal obligation.  
Much of Part I of Choice Theory argues that earlier attempts to face this legitimacy 
challenge, including Benson’s, predictably fail because they ask the wrong question.  They 
seek to justify the duty contract imposes even though people’s interpersonal obligations 
are exhausted by reciprocal respect for each other’s independence. But starting from “the 
obligation of reciprocal respect for self-determination that underlies private law” shows 
that “there is nothing mysterious in the duty to perform” (42). Our reference to private law 
here was not accidental, as we demonstrated in the following pages in Choice Theory 
referring to the (modest) affirmative interpersonal duties private law imposes. 
As one of us argued in detail elsewhere, these affirmative duties are not a blemish 
on a liberal private law. Quite the contrary: the facts of interdependence and personal 
difference – and thus the vulnerability and the valuable options to which these social 
conditions give rise – imply that the liberal commitment to individual self-determination 
cannot be excluded from the law governing horizontal relationships.31 This means that 
although private law should take seriously the typically excessive interference with 
people’s autonomy which affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others entail, it need not – 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016); 
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework, 37 L. & 
PHIL. 171 (2018). 
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indeed should not – subscribe to a blanket rejection of affirmative duties in private law, 
which prior formulations of contract legitimacy challenge.  
This cautionary note explains the suspicion of liberal law towards affirmative duties 
(a point which we come back to when we explain and justify the common law’s preference 
for pecuniary remedies). It also explains the actual workings of private law, namely, the 
many affirmative duties it does acknowledge, which typically involve – in line with Hart’s 
dictum32 – an infringement of independence that does not seriously jeopardize self-
determination. And it is exactly this point that provides the key to the legitimacy of contract 
enforcement. If affirmative interpersonal duties are categorically excluded from private 
law, it is indeed hard to explain how the autonomy-enhancing implications of contract can 
legitimate its legal form. But once the spurious, blanket rejection of affirmative duties from 
private law is rejected, Choice Theory argues, the mystery of contract enforcement 
dissolves.  
Indeed, private law’s grundnorm of reciprocal respect to self-determination, which 
governs people’s interpersonal relationships in a liberal polity, implies that there is neither 
a way nor a reason to bypass the modest interpersonal burden that law imposes on a 
promisor who voluntarily invokes the contract convention while engaging with the 
promisee. As Benson puts this very same point in a Rawlsian vocabulary, “Because each 
side has chosen to do something which brings into play the other as a co-equal participant 
with separate and independent interests, each has chosen to enter a relation which is subject 
to interpersonal norms and standards: each party, as a reasonable person, must therefore 
recognize the fair and reasonable meaning of their interaction as a transaction between 
two” (30).  
We will shortly address Benson’s second critique, regarding the challenge of fit. 
But because part of our response to Markovits and Schwartz overlaps with our response to 
this challenge, we will take both at our last section and turn now to Markovits and 
Schwartz’s critique in which choice theory ends up in the unhappy predicament of the pre-
Willistonian unprincipled multiplicity. 
* * * 
8.  Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz.  The focus of Markovits and Schwartz’s 
penetrating inquiry is the plurality of values “that are openly and notoriously at play in 
contract practice,” that renders, for them, “the life of the law too unruly to confine within 
any single logic” (2).  Markovits and Schwartz accept that philosophers might be able to 
show that efficiency, autonomy, equality, and community (the four values they mention) 
“cohere in a single framework or arise from a single basic source” (3).  But they believe 
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that lawyers and judges necessarily resist any such philosophical framework because it is 
unlikely to address the more concrete concerns to which law must account (3-4).  
This limitation leaves contract theorists with three strategies to avoid the perils of 
pluralism, and each with its own virtues and vices.  First, they can resort to capitulation, 
which “involves seeking domains that are insulated from pluralism, because only one value 
governs them” (9). They illustrate this strategy by reference to their own prior work, 
explaining business transactions through an efficiency lens (Schwartz and Scott) and 
agreements regarding professional services through a community one (Markovits).  They 
candidly admit their own work illustrates the hazards resulting from the artificial 
delimitation of contract’s domain and from the resulting distortion that it inevitably 
generates (5-7). 
The second strategy to avoid pluralism “flees in opposite direction” by leveraging, 
which “involves seeking domains to which pluralism applies but only to create 
redundancies, because all values recommend the same result” (9).  This strategy seeks to 
identify a pockets of contract practices where “irreducibly plural” values converge around 
a specific reformist argument.  Leveraging necessarily has “only a very narrow scope of 
application” (7-9).  
Markovits and Schwartz also identify a third and “very different” approach:  
embracing value pluralism, which “does not flee from but rather embraces the diversity of 
values at play in contract practice and also the varieties of practice that arise in the shadow 
of these values” (4, 9).  This approach, Markovits and Schwartz argue, typically requires 
the theorist to “abandon or at least retreat from theory’s conventional simplifying ambitions 
in favor of interpreting and displaying the complexity that practice unavoidably presents” 
(4). Choice Theory, in their view, exemplifies this embracing strategy (5, 9) as is most 
clearly demonstrated by our taxonomy of contract’s domain.  The taxonomy seeks to “track 
lived experience,” and thus construct contract spheres and contract types “out of the 
intuitive, pre-theoretical categories,” namely: “out of the materials that parties, lawyers, 
and judges first look to when considering drafting, litigating, or adjudicating contracts” 
(10).33 
For Markovits and Schwartz, Choice Theory involves a tradeoff.  They 
acknowledge that embracing multiplicity has some virtues:  choice theory may avoid both 
the incompleteness and “the distortions that arise from viewing a multifaceted practice 
through a single lens” (16). But this virtue entails a significant theoretical cost, because it 
leaves “the disorder associated with accommodating too many values” intact, thus 
undermining “the point of a theory, which is to explain something by organizing otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33 The other is our attempt to “highlight backwaters,” such as bailment, to illustrate both “how fine-
grained the taxonomy of contracts might become” and how even relatively obscure doctrines can 
demonstrate our theory (9-10).  
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unruly considerations into patterns that are simpler and more general than the pre-
theoretical practice to be explained” (4). This vice, they insist, cannot be avoided by our 
resort to autonomy as contract’s ultimate value: any attempt to really subordinate choice 
theory’s pluralism to autonomy, they suggest, is bound to be self-defeating.  Why?  
Because it inevitably collapses choice theory’s pluralism down to the capitulating strategy.  
In the end, they argue, we are left with an account that is both too capacious, and at the 
same time unstructured and indeed uninformative (9, 11, 16). 
As a result, choice theory cannot help with concrete legal practice.  Markovits and 
Schwartz argue, for example, that an open-ended embrace of pluralism cannot arbitrate 
between an employment contract type that minimizes a typical dyad’s contracting costs 
and one that generates a smaller expected economic surplus because it “includes hiring 
disadvantaged persons” (14). This indeterminacy implies that choice theory sets a task that 
“no institution could do” (13).  
How did we go so far astray?  Markovits and Schwartz suggest that the source of 
our error lies in our background as property scholars.   We were (mis)led to analyze contract 
as if it was property, where “the state specifies the forms that agents must use in order to 
hold property” (1, 12). But contract rules are dramatically different because they function 
largely as implied terms.  If choice theory embraces value pluralism and seeks to avoid 
illegitimate state impositions, then it must, in Markovits and Schwartz’ account, require 
contract law to offer an implausibly large number of contract types, so as to fit every 
possible value ranking respecting the (huge) range of possible project descriptions, sets of 
goals, and sets of actions needed to achieve them (12-15).34  
These are heavy charges.  We discuss them in reverse order because our answers to 
Markovits and Schwartz’s practical questions also jumpstart our responses to their 
theoretical challenge. 
To begin, we reject the sharp dichotomy between contract and property. The 
categories are, in large measure, artificial silos.  The continuities between property and 
contract are quite significant – notwithstanding some differences that derive mostly from 
property’s in rem character.35 Property law increasingly recognizes – as it should, in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 This difficulty is exacerbated once we consider the heterogeneity of the utility functions of parties 
to contracts outside the commercial spheres (14).  
35 One seemingly categorical difference derives from property’s numerus clausus. But even strict 
adherence to this principle does not practically undermine parties’ choice; moreover, we think that 
a liberal property system must follow the rule in Spain (among other countries) which recognizes 
– alongside the state-supported property types – the option of “tailor-made” property rights. See, 
respectively, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, * (2000); DAGAN, supra note 17, at 
*. 
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liberal polity – the possibility of contracting around property rules.36 But this trend does 
not negate the significance of law’s facilitation of property types. When, for example, 
property law entrenched common-interest-communities as a property type, it saved on 
transaction costs involved in tailoring this type from scratch and – even more significantly 
– added a salient option to the housing market. Common-interest-communities vary widely, 
and thus require further refinement, but this does not denigrate from the empowering effect 
of adding this type to our property inventory. 
The exact same reasoning applies to the relationship between contract types and the 
possible project descriptions, sets of goals, and sets of actions of specific parties who resort 
to a given contract type. Choice theory requires that, for every sphere of contracting, law 
should provide a variety of sufficiently distinctive contract types – a bounded variety, not 
an infinite mishmash as Markovits and Schwartz would have it.  For this bounded variety 
to be autonomy-enhancing, as choice theory prescribes, these types need to be partial 
functional substitutes for each other: “They need to be substitutes because choice is not 
enhanced with alternatives that are orthogonal to each other; and their substitutability 
should not be too complete because types that are too similar also do not offer meaningful 
choice” (106-107). 
This understanding of types implies an important, even if imprecise, distinction 
between different types and different terms. It also clarifies that choice theory does not 
expect legal institutions to tailor precise scripts for every contract-dyad; its autonomy-
enhancing telos does not, in other words, necessitate the degree of granularity ascribed to 
it by Markovits and Schwartz. Rather, for contract law to perform its autonomy-enhancing 
work, it is enough for it to construct a repertoire of contract types, each suited to a 
paradigmatic category of projects, a typical set of goals, and a corresponding typical set of 
actions, that can be thus structured around a distinct (and robust) animating principle.  
There is no reason to think that the number of such categories of contract types is 
dramatically different from the number of property types.  Either way, our claim does not 
rely on answering that question.  We make a more limited observation:  in the commercial 
sphere, contracting parties seem to like having choice, and when they find their choices 
insufficient, they seem able to catalyze new types and manage the resulting multiplicity.  
Private actors and legal institutions have created a robust repertoire of commercial contract 
types.  If they are up to this task in the commercial sphere, perhaps they are as well in other 
contracting spheres.    
Markovits and Schwartz maintain choice theory would be reluctant to “simplify its 
type creation task by limiting types to reasonable or appropriately balanced value 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 This trend is manifested most significantly in the traditionally immutable areas of marital 
property and of servitudes. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 7 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
SERVITUDES §§2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.2 (2000). 
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judgments; for to do that is to impose an evaluative frame,” because such limits would 
undermine its commitment to pluralism (15). But choice theory is not neutral when it comes 
to contract types that involve relational injustice (as we clarified in our response to 
Bagchi37).  Let’s return to the employment contract dilemma that Markovits and Schwartz 
raised.  If the conflict involves a type that complies with relational justice (by proscribing 
discrimination) and one that authorizes relational injustice (by allowing contract practices 
that undermine its own telos of reciprocal respect to self-determination), then choice theory 
would not hesitate to opt for the former.  
We do not deny, of course, that this “floor” of relational justice would still leave a 
huge set of options, which means that only a fraction of potential alternatives become actual 
contract types. That’s fine.  Relational justice excludes bad types.  For the rest, judgment 
should be guided not by normative evaluation, but by commitment to ensuring partial 
functional equivalents and by attention to pragmatic considerations, relating notably to 
what Klass dubs as “the mechanics of choice.”  
Choice Theory’s discussion of these matters (106-07) is admittedly preliminary, 
partly because it requires social scientific skills that we lack.38 But this task is not 
impossible:  it does not implicate overly-perfectionist value judgments nor does it require 
unbounded multiplicity of contract types.     
These responses to Markovits and Schwartz’s implementation challenge also help 
clarify how, specifically, choice theory is pluralist (and how it isn’t).   And they begin to 
explain how our reliance on “autonomy as self-determination” structures contract’s 
seemingly conflicting values. Let us now make these lessons more explicit. 
Markovits and Schwartz believe there is a deep, indeed irreconcilable, tension 
between choice theory’s commitment to autonomy and its embrace of pluralism.  For them, 
this tension pushes choice theory to employ an uninformative conception of autonomy. In 
this reading, a seemingly-charitable reading of choice theory would understand autonomy 
not as contract’s “master value,” but rather as merely “one value among many” (16, 11). 
We agree that an account of contract that relied on such foundational value 
pluralism would be vulnerable the critique of indeterminacy and it may end up failing in 
its aspiration for guidance or evaluation. But choice theory is not foundationally pluralist.39  
This may be hard to explain, but it is central to our argument. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
38 We do not imply that the work of social science here should, or can, supplant legal theory, but 
rather that it is a necessary input for its further development. 
39 For the distinction between foundational pluralism and autonomy-based pluralism, see HANOCH 
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 
171-73 (2013). 
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As we tried to clarify in Chapters 5 and 6 of Choice Theory, choice theory’s 
normative pluralism is limited to the goods of contracts – utility and community. This 
domain of normative pluralism is circumscribed due to our understanding of utility and 
community (respectively) as instrumental and intrinsic values.  But they are in turn 
subordinate to autonomy, contract’s ultimate value. Choice theory is not pluralist all the 
way up. 
Because utility and community typify the goods people seek when resorting to 
contracts, accommodating them under autonomy’s ultimate rule allows choice theory to 
avoid the pitfalls of capitulation that are indeed endemic to accounts – such as Schwartz’s 
and Markovits’ – that situate utility or community at the core of their theories.  Our account 
also avoids the capitulation costs of previous autonomy-based accounts that fail to 
appreciate the significance of multiplicity to autonomy.40  Choice theory embraces the 
complexity of contract practice, but rejects foundational value pluralism.   
Choice theory is insistently agnostic regarding the various combinations of 
“dosages” of community and utility that a society chooses in its contract types – so long as 
they are above the relational justice floor, so long as there are enough partial functional 
substitutes, and so long as the range of types attends to the mechanics of choice – as we 
clarified in Part I of this Response.   
At the same time, choice theory is adamantly opinionated in its commitment to the 
parties’ autonomy. Thus, choice theory rejects attempts to use contract for – let alone 
claims that contract law should actively facilitate – practices that are autonomy-reducing.  
Because reciprocal respect to self-determination is the foundation of contract law’s 
legitimacy, its implications for contract law design are not optional.  In other words, while 
choice theory embraces the plurality of contract types, its value pluralism is emphatically 
not foundational, but rather autonomy-based. And Markovits and Schwartz’s skepticism 
notwithstanding, we argue that this combination – foundational autonomy with pluralist 
types – does generate sufficiently determinate prescriptions to make it a theory properly-
so-called. 
We admittedly addressed only some of these points in Choice Theory and added a 
few more in the previous section.  There is much more to be said on this front. Happily, 
much of this unfinished business converges with our debt to Benson’s critique. As may be 
recalled, we still need to respond to Benson’s second complaint – regarding choice theory’s 
fit with the existing contract canon. Benson is correct in claiming that an important 
dimension in assessing a theory of contract law is the degree to which it actually accounts 
for existing doctrine. Sharpening the prescriptions of choice theory’s autonomy-based 
foundation allows us to demonstrate choice theory’s explanatory power – and put to rest 
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Markovitz and Schwartz’s concerns about the vices of our embracing approach. This is the 
task of the last section of this Response. 
* * * 
9.  The Contract Canon.  We hoped, in Choice Theory, to highlight the 
underappreciated potential contribution of contract types to our autonomy and to push 
theorists and policymakers to consider expanding the inventory of contract types for work, 
home, and intimacy. In focusing on this goal – and with the aim of writing a short book – 
we indeed paid too little attention to demonstrating the broader implications of choice 
theory to contract law.  In the book, we emphasized the hitherto marginalized significance 
of the intra-sphere multiplicity of contract types by celebrating contract’s autonomy-
enhancing telos and through its claim that the legitimacy of contract law is grounded in 
private law’s foundational prescription of reciprocal respect to self-determination. But, in 
addition to this lesson, choice theory also fits and elucidates the fabric of the existing canon 
of contract law.  In other words, choice theory better explains the most salient rules, 
doctrines, and cases that currently predominate in contracts casebooks and scholarship.   
Reconstructing the contract canon in the mold of choice theory is an important and 
formidable task that we are undertaking in future work.41  For our current purposes, a quick 
roadmap should (hopefully) suffice. Our response to Benbaji previews such an exercise. 
Choice theory implies, we’ve argued, that contract law in a liberal society must follow 
three guiding principles: 
(1) Law should proactively facilitate contracts.  
(2) Law should take seriously the autonomy of the parties’ future self. 
(3) Relational justice must serve as the floor of legitimate contractual interactions 
eligible for law’s support.   
While we discussed each of these principles in Choice Theory, we realize now that 
we did so in an ad hoc manner, with the building blocks scattered through Part II.  There is 
more to say on their interrelationships, particularly in the context of the existing contract 
canon.  A broad set of actually-existing contract rules nicely respond to, and are in fact 
entailed by, these three principles; indeed, we claim they play a key role in the legal 
constitution of contract from inception to breakdown.  
Core rules that govern the life of contracts all partake of the same autonomy-
enhancing mission and thus necessarily follow the principles it entails. Such rules include 
those that regulate the bargaining process and formation of contracts; determine the parties’ 
obligations by identifying and interpreting their agreement, filling gaps, and setting up 
norms for performance and excuse; and finally define the consequences of breach by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, Choice Theory and the Canon of Contract Law (unpublished 
work in progress). 
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prescribing the type and scope of available remedies.  It is impossible properly to discuss 
this vast terrain in the little space left for this Response. So here is a snapshot, taking the 
three principles in turn (and reserving detailed case citation and analysis till later). 
(1) Proactive Facilitation.  The objective theory of contract is a good first example 
for the principle of active facilitation. While many theories of contract (including 
Benson’s) support the objective approach, choice theory provides a particularly-secure 
justification for its role in modern contract law. Indeed, we believe the contemporary status 
of the objective theory is best explained by the qualitative difference between the rather 
limited autonomy-enhancing potential of a subjective theory of contract and the far more 
impressive potential of its objective counterpart. We think that this explanation can also 
helpfully re-channel and clarify some of the most contentious issues of contract doctrine 
dealing with the parol evidence rule and with contract interpretation. 
Taking seriously contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos not only justifies the 
widespread endorsement the objective theory, but also justifies and explains further 
doctrinal features of contract law. First, consider incomplete agreements.  While the 
traditional common law was hesitant to enforce incomplete agreements, modern law takes 
a diametrically opposite attitude.42 Contemporary contract law is no longer satisfied with 
providing enforcement services to parties who fully specify the terms of their engagement. 
To be sure, where the parties “intentionally and deliberately” do not “incorporate in their 
agreements readily available, verifiable measures of performance,” courts correctly infer 
that they do not intend legal enforcement.43 But beyond this category, current law—both 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts44—goes out of 
its way to facilitate transactions by offering defaults that can fill gaps, even regarding 
crucial aspects of a transaction, like price.45  A significant subset of the current contract 
law canon belongs to this category.  
Making gap-filling a core function of contract law quickly necessitates a significant 
degree of variation among contract types. In other words, expanding the facilitative 
ambition of contract law requires it to adjust the means with which it can identify mutually 
beneficial interactions worthy of its support as well as the rules that can best support them. 
This devotion to contract’s autonomy-enhancement telos can explain and justify the 
development of promissory estoppel and of the material benefit rule as contracts’ additional 
gatekeeping doctrines alongside the traditional consideration doctrine. It likewise accounts 
for the gradual recognition that other rules which are at times presented as part of contract 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 120-21 (4th ed. 2004). 
43  Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 
1657, 1659 (2003).  
44 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). 
45 See U.C.C. § 2-305. 
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law’s signature core – like the mirror image rule for offer and acceptance, the standard of 
performance of perfect tender, the promisor’s strict liability, or the dominance of 
expectation damages – all in fact prevail only in certain contract types, and not in others.  
The step we have emphasized most in Choice Theory – ensuring sufficient contract 
types and securing intra-sphere multiplicity – is indeed a necessary feature of a liberal 
contract law that takes seriously its commitment proactively to facilitate contract’s 
autonomy-enhancing potential. While we identified an important reformist agenda in the 
book, we should also highlight the substantial steps contract law has already taken to 
implement choice theory. Think, for example, of contract-type innovations – exclusive 
dealings, outputs, and requirement contracts – that nicely follow choice theory’s 
prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity and are by now part of the canon.46 
(2) Autonomy of the Future Self.  Bolstering the facilitative effect of contract law 
in these ways makes the second principle noted above – dealing with the need to consider 
the autonomy of the parties’ future self – particularly significant. But its normative power 
need not rely on this additional urgency. Rather, it derives immediately from contract’s 
autonomy-enhancing telos: A law that confers upon people the normative power to commit 
themselves through contracts in the name of enhancing their self-determination cannot 
ignore the impact of such contracts on their future selves. Self-authorship, after all, stands 
for our right to write and re-write the story of our life. Appreciating this tension, which is 
inherent in contract’s raison d’être (any act of self-authorship constrains the future self), 
implies that contract law needs to be particularly careful in defining the scope of the 
obligations it enforces and in circumscribing their implications. 
The main doctrinal manifestations of this principle can be divided into four sets of 
rules. The first set – the rules dealing with mutual mistake and with impossibility, 
impracticability and frustration47 – is straightforward. These doctrines delimit the parties’ 
obligations by reference to their shared basic assumptions with regard to facts or to the 
occurrence of a future contingency material to their agreement.48 Risks that fall outside of 
this domain, and not allocated to the adversely affected party, should not encumber his or 
her future self. Applying this rule may be difficult – and its details vary across contract 
types – but its autonomy-enhancing rationale is straightforward: there is no “autonomy 
gain” in enforcing contracts that go beyond the parties’ own basic assumptions. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
46 See U.C.C. § 2-306. As the text (and Choice Theory) suggests, pace Benson’s claim (37-40), 
judges’ situation sense, their development of modes of currency, and their recognition of legal 
formalities cannot plausibly suffice for properly facilitating transaction types, and so existing law 
goes well beyond these modest means. 
47 This paragraph provides a preliminary response to Markovits and Schwartz’s reference to the 
excuse rule (11) as an example of a contract doctrine that may seem unrelated to choice theory and 
thus unaffected by its prescriptions. 
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152-52 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-615. 
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Second, and on the other side of the spectrum, we observed in Choice Theory a set 
of rules that prescribe the outer limits of people’s power to commit, such as restrictions on 
the enforceability of employee non-compete agreements, limits on the advance sale of 
future wages, and the semi-inalienability of the unilateral right of termination of long-term 
contracts. In many of these cases, the parties’ intention to commit is clear. But even when 
this is the case, an autonomy-enhancing contract law must be careful not to undermine 
people’s mobility in a way that ends up being detrimental to their self-determination.  In 
other words, a liberal contract law must acknowledge the possibility of regret, which these 
rules indeed enshrine, not only as a response to rationality deficiencies or market failures, 
but rather as an inherent entailment of our most fundamental commitment to people’s right 
to (re)invent themselves.  
Third, consider remedies. These rules are guided by an effort to minimize the future 
autonomy-constraining effects of a present autonomy-enhancing commitment. Many 
limitations on remedies for breach of contract nicely belong to this category. The most 
salient rule here deals with the severe limitations on specific performance (and its cognates) 
in the common law tradition. This traditional strong preference for monetary recovery is 
not, as mistakenly presented by some critics, an embarrassment to contract law, but rather 
a salutary testament to contract law’s underlying liberal commitments.  
Finally, situating the parties’ self-determination at the core of contract’s normative 
infrastructure nicely accounts for the subtle, yet at times significant, difference between 
the pertinent rules of contract types that involve people’s self-identity and those that are 
only about material concerns. The prime example here again comes from the law of specific 
performance typified by a rigid resistance against awarding such a remedy in service 
contracts.49 The same sensitivity to the difference between “me” and “mine” explains and 
indeed justifies the inapplicability of any reasonableness inquiry regarding refusals to 
accept a different or inferior position in mitigation of breach of a personal service contract.  
(3) Relational Justice.  The final guiding principle begins with choice theory’s 
proposition, noted repeatedly in these pages, in which the legitimacy of enforcing contracts 
– even wholly executory contracts – necessarily relies on the most fundamental foundation 
of a liberal private law of reciprocal respect for self-determination, which includes 
(modest) affirmative interpersonal obligations. Once we appreciate that reciprocal respect 
for self-determination is the premise of contract’s own legitimacy, it becomes evident that 
any attempt to recruit the law in the service of an agreement that defies this premise must 
be treated as ultra vires: an abuse of the idea of contract, that is, use of contract law for a 
purpose that contravenes its telos.50  
                                                                                                                                                                             
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981).  
50 We again find ourselves here in agreement with Benson’s “Rawlsian” proposition that “at every 
step in the argument contract law must specify principles and rules that reflect the requirements of 
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There is again a long set of doctrinal rules that secure contract law’s integrity by 
guaranteeing its compliance with this prescription of relational justice. Some of these rules 
are products of adjudication; others were enacted by legislatures and regulatory agencies, 
oftentimes after the common law has set a vague standard which legislators and regulators 
are better suited to pin down. We can identify four sets of contract rules that robustly 
vindicate contract law’s requirement of relational justice as the “admission criterion” for 
recruiting its support. 
Consider first rules that regulate the parties’ bargaining process in a way that goes 
beyond the traditional laissez faire mode of proscribing the active interference of one party 
with the other’s free will. These rules expand the set of vitiating factors by prescribing 
affirmative interpersonal obligations. This category includes cases that apply the doctrine 
of duress even where the promisee did not cause the promisor’s distress and the similarly 
motivated and more general anti-price-gouging and anti-profiteering laws.  Also, admiralty 
rules of salvage.  
Concern for relational justice likewise accounts for the expansion of the law of 
fraud beyond the traditional categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include 
also – notably in real estate and securities transactions – disclosure duties. This conceptual 
expansion also underlies the doctrine of unilateral mistake. Finally, a charitable reading of 
unconscionability doctrine and some of its regulatory cognates nicely fits a regime which 
is careful to ensure that contract is used only in settings that comply with the minimal 
requirements of reciprocal respect to self-determination. 
A parallel group of quite diverse rules includes moderate duties to assist in 
promoting each other’s self-determination which together solidify a cooperative 
conception of contract performance. An important member of this group is the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing which sets up the contractual rules of the game. But it is not the only 
one. The substantial performance doctrine in service contracts, the role of the principle 
against forfeiture in applying the condition/promises distinction, the modern tendency to 
expand the excuses for nonperformance and to validate contract modifications due to 
changed circumstances, as well as the veteran burden to mitigate and the choice of the 
expectation interest as the default measure of recovery can all be interpreted as belonging 
to this cooperative framework.  
The last two sub-categories of doctrines that vindicate contract law’s compliance 
with relational justice are not part of the conventional canon of contract law, but are 
increasingly part of the actual life of contract. Highlighting the continuity between these 
doctrines and the more canonical manifestations of relational justice in contract law noted 
above can thus help to demonstrate the prevalence of relational justice in existing doctrine.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the reasonable and so can legitimately constrain parties through the coercive enforcement of legal 
duties and rights” (33).  
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One subcategory mandates the minimal level of interpersonal decency contract law 
is willing to accept regarding contract types that significantly affect the personhood of one 
of the parties – regarding for example, minimum wages, safety in the workplace, and the 
habitability of homes.  Relational justice is the most plausible foundation for this group of 
immutable contract rules, which are by now entrenched, but whose grounding is 
nonetheless still tormented as a matter of contract theory.  The other subcategory concerns 
duties to respect the contractual party as the person she actually is, and thus accommodate 
her constitutive features such as race, gender, nationality, religion, disability, familial 
status, and sexual orientation. At times, these duties are relevant to the content of the 
parties’ obligations.  More often, however, they serve as “gatekeepers” to ensure that 
parties who make systemic use of contract – by becoming employers, landlords, or owners 
of public accommodations that offer services to the public – do not apply discriminatory 
practices in their choice of contractual counterparts and thus contravene the requirement of 
reciprocal respect to self-determination on which contract is founded.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Choice Theory advances a claim about the centrality of freedom to contract.  In the 
book we situate efficiency-based and community-based accounts of contract as building 
blocks of an autonomy-enhancing contract law.  We argue that a liberal and general theory 
requires the state proactively to ensure availability of a diverse range of normatively-
attractive contract types in the key spheres of contract: commerce, work, home, and 
intimacy.  This is a provocative position.  Does it hold up? 
Our goal with Choice Theory was, in part, to trigger debate among the world’s 
leading contract scholars regarding contract’s role in securing freedom and facilitating 
choice – and to move thinking forward on fundamental questions in the field:  Does 
contract serve freedom and choice, and if so, how?  Who should make the choices that 
contract law facilitates, and how should they do so?  And what is the proper relationship 
between contract law and contract types? 
Each paper in this Issue advances the field.  Reflecting on them has forced us to 
adjust, clarify, and refine choice theory.  On balance, choice theory holds up well.  It comes 
out stronger, and to our minds, more persuasive.  But there is much more work to be done.  
Together, we continue on a mutual path toward a more just and justified law of contract. 
 
